

APPENDIX

RED FLAG INDICATORS FOR LABUAN IBFC

Introduction

The list of red flag indicators is specific to the inherent characteristics and vulnerabilities associated with financial activities. They are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Upon applying these red flag indicators, Labuan entities must not refer to only one indicator to determine whether a transaction is suspicious or linked to a terrorist activity.

Part I: Red Flag Indicators for Labuan Digital Financial Services

The digital financial services have the potential for enhancing financial innovation and efficiency. Nevertheless, due to the unique features, the services pose money laundering and terrorist financing risks as well as the potential for transferring digital assets outside regulated systems and attribute to disability in tracing funds transfer.

1. Indicators relating to Customer Due Diligence Process

- (a) Incomplete or insufficient information, or the customer declines to provide supporting documents or enquiries regarding source of funds;
- (b) Lack of information or provide inaccurate of information on transaction, source of funds or counterparty. This may include the use of shell companies or those funds placed in an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) where personal data of investors may not be available or incoming transactions from online payments system;
- (c) A customer provides forged documents or edited documents e.g. photographs, identification documents as follows:
 - (i) A customer provides identification or account credentials (e.g. a non-standard IP address, or flash cookies) shared by another account.
 - (ii) Discrepancies between IP addresses associated with the customer's profile and the IP addresses from which transactions are being initiated.

- (iii) A customer's digital asset address appears on public forums associated with illegal activity.
- (iv) A customer is known via publicly available information to law enforcement due to previous criminal association.
- (d) A customer's funds which are sourced directly from third-party mixing services or wallet tumblers;
- (e) The bulk of a customer's source of wealth is derived from investment in digital assets, ICOs or fraudulent ICOs, etc.; and
- (f) A customer's source of wealth is disproportionately drawn from digital assets originating from other digital asset service providers that have deficiency of AML/CFT controls.

2. Indicators relating to Transaction Size and Frequency

- (a) Structured transactions in small amounts and under the record-keeping or reporting thresholds;
- (b) Multiple high-value transactions; and
- (c) Transfers of digital assets immediately to multiple digital asset service providers, including those registered or operated in other countries.

3. Indicators relating to Irregular, Unusual or Uncommon Transaction Patterns

- (a) New users make a large initial deposit to open a new relationship with a digital asset service provider, inconsistent with the customer profile;
- (b) Transactions involve multiple digital assets, or multiple accounts, without a logical business explanation;
- (c) Frequent transfers occur in a certain period to the same digital asset account by more than one person, from the same location or concerning large amounts;
- (d) Creations of separate accounts under different names to circumvent restrictions on trading or withdrawal limits imposed by digital asset service providers;
- (e) Transactions initiated from non-trusted IP addresses, IP addresses from sanctioned jurisdictions or IP addresses previously flagged as suspicious;

- (f) A customer attempts to open an account frequently within the same digital asset service provider from the same IP address;
- (g) A customer frequently changes his/her identification information, including email addresses, IP addresses or financial information, which may also indicate takeover of the customer's account;
- (h) The use of language in digital asset message fields indicative of the transactions are related to illicit activities or for the purchase of illicit goods; and
- (i) A customer repeatedly conducts transactions with a subset of individuals at significant profit or loss. This could indicate potential account takeover and attempted extraction of victim balances via trade, or money laundering scheme to obfuscate funds flow with a digital asset service provider infrastructure.

4. Indicators relating to Technological Features

- (a) Transactions involving more than one type of digital assets particularly those that provide higher anonymity, such as anonymity enhanced cryptocurrency or privacy coins;
- (b) Digital assets moved from a public transparent blockchain to a centralised exchange and then immediately traded for anonymity enhanced cryptocurrency or privacy coin;
- (c) A customer that operates as an unlicensed digital asset service provider on peer-to-peer exchange website;
- (d) Digital assets traded to or from wallets that indicated the use of mixing or tumbling services or peer-to-peer platforms;
- (e) For merchants/corporate users, their Internet domain registrations are in a different jurisdiction than their jurisdiction of establishment or in a jurisdiction with a weak process for domain registration;
- (f) A customer tries to enter one or more digital asset service providers from different IP addresses frequently over the course of a day; and
- (g) Abnormal transaction activities of digital assets from peer-to-peer platform associated wallets with no logical business explanation.

5. Indicators relating to Geographical Risks

- (a) Customer's funds originate from, or are sent to, an exchange that is not registered in the country where either the customer or exchange is located;
- (b) A customer utilises a digital asset exchange or foreign-located Money Value Transfer Service in a high-risk country which has insufficient or inadequate AML/CFT regulations for digital asset entities, including inadequate Customer Due Diligence or Know-Your-Customer measures;
- (c) A customer sends funds to digital asset service providers operating in jurisdictions that have no digital asset regulation or have not implemented AML/CFT controls; and
- (d) A customer sets up offices in or moves offices to jurisdictions that have no regulation or have not implemented regulations governing digital assets or sets up new offices in jurisdictions where there is no clear business rationale.

6. Indicators relating to Profile of Potential Money Mule or Scam Victims

- (a) The sender does not appear to be familiar with digital asset technology or online custodial wallet solutions. Such persons could be money mules recruited by professional money launderers, or scam victims turned mules who are deceived into transferring illicit proceeds without knowledge of their origins;
- (b) A customer significantly older than the average age of platform users opens an account and engages in large numbers of transactions, suggesting their potential role as a digital asset money mule or a victim of financial exploitation of the elderly;
- (c) A customer being a financially vulnerable person, who is often used by drug dealers to assist them in their trafficking business; and
- (d) A customer purchases large amounts of digital assets not substantiated by available wealth or consistent with the customer's historical financial profile, which may indicate money laundering, a money mule, or a scam victim.

Part II (A): Red Flag Indicators for Labuan Non-Profit Organisations (Labuan NPOs) to Screen Potential Donors

This list outlines red flag indicators for Labuan Non-Profit Organisations (Labuan NPOs)¹ to consider when screening potential donors as part of their "Know-Your-Donor" (KYD) process. Ensuring that donations are sourced from legitimate and transparent origins is a critical component of safeguarding the financial integrity and reputation of Labuan NPOs. The indicators provided are intended to assist Labuan NPOs in identifying and addressing potential risks associated with donations received by the Labuan NPOs that may be linked to terrorism financing (TF), criminal activity or other illicit purposes.

1. Indicators Relating to Donor's Identity and Background

- (a) Donations originating from individuals or entities located in jurisdictions with known ties to terrorism or prevalent TF;
- (b) Donors with known affiliations to groups or activities associated with terrorism or criminal organisations;
- (c) Donors identified as Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), or closely associated with PEPs, that potentially exposed to higher risk of involvement in corruption, bribery or illicit financial activities;
- (d) Donors providing false, incomplete, or fraudulent identification or documentation to conceal their true identity or origin;
- (e) Donors unwilling or unable to provide adequate documentation or be transparent regarding their identity, source of funds or the purpose of the donation; and
- (f) Donors providing inconsistent contact information, financial details, or other identifying information across multiple donations made.

2. Indicators Relating to Donor's Source of Funds

- (a) Donations coming from individuals or entities directly listed on terrorism watchlists, or whose funds are suspected to be linked to terrorist organisations;
- (b) Donations coming from sources or financial institutions that cannot be easily traced or verified;

¹ Labuan Non-Profit Organisations (Labuan NPOs) refer to Labuan charitable foundations and Labuan charitable trusts.

- (c) Donors contributing large sums or assets with no clear explanation, or the source of funds is highly obscure;
- (d) Donors making large, unexplained cash donations or deposits into the Labuan NPO's account, particularly from high-risk jurisdictions;
- (e) Donors providing in-kind donations that could potentially have a hidden or disguised value, complicating the traceability of the donation; and
- (f) Large or frequent donations made anonymously, or through third parties, making it difficult to trace the origin or purpose of the funds.

3. Indicators Relating to Donation Amount and Patterns

- (a) Donors making unusually large or repeated donations disproportionate to the size and operational needs of the Labuan NPOs;
- (b) Fluctuating or sudden changes in donation patterns, such as a significant increase in donations shortly before a major event or after an international crisis, especially when these donations are not linked to any immediate and visible charitable response;
- (c) Donors contributing from multiple international locations with no apparent link to the Labuan NPOs' declared mission or region of operation, particularly when these regions are known for terrorism activity;
- (d) Donors contributing through complex banking arrangements or financial networks, especially transfers from abroad;
- (e) Donors attaching conditions to their contribution or explicitly request that portion of the donation be returned to them or redirected to their preferred regions or individuals; and
- (f) Donors providing funds on the condition that the Labuan NPOs engage certain people or organisations with known link to high-risk regions to handle work or projects.

Part II (B): Red Flag Indicators to Identify the Misuses of NPOs

NPOs are targeted by terrorist entities due to their ability to legitimately access materials, funds and networks. Terrorist organisations may exploit NPOs, including Labuan NPOs to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, recruit members, or provide a veil of legitimacy for their operations. The following red flag indicators reflect potential cases of terrorism financing (TF) or NPOs' involvement in TF. These indicators can assist Labuan entities to better identify and mitigate suspicious NPOs' activity potentially linked to TF.

1. Indicators Relating to Founder/Settlor or Employee/Volunteer

- (a) The founder/settlor, employees or volunteers located in high-risk jurisdictions known to support terrorism or have been identified as TF hubs;
- (b) The founder/settlor, employees or volunteers with link to individuals or entities listed on terrorism watchlists;
- (c) The founder/settlor, employees or volunteers affiliated with known terrorist groups influencing the operations and decision-making of the NPOs;
- (d) The founder/settlor, employees or volunteers affiliated with unregistered charitable organisations that link to terrorist groups or originated from high-risk jurisdictions; and
- (e) Use of fake or fraudulent identification by employees or volunteers to gain employment within the NPO for purposes of facilitating TF.

2. Indicators Relating to NPO's Transactional Activities

- (a) Transactions that are disproportionately large or complex compared to the size or nature of the NPO's activities;
- (b) Discrepancy between the NPO's financial activities and its declared mission or charitable objectives, suggesting funds may be misused or diverted for illicit purposes;
- (c) Use of crowdfunding or social media platforms to raise funds, which are later suspended or redirected to high-risk areas;
- (d) Fundraising events used to raise substantial amounts, only for the funds to be transferred through unauthorized third parties or into regions known for terrorist activity;

- (e) Funds raised by the NPO diverted for personal use or transferred to accounts linked to terrorism;
- (f) The NPO providing unclear justifications and refraining from submitting sufficient documentation when the financial institution requests information regarding transfers to high-risk locations or entities;
- (g) The NPO unable to explain the end-use of its funds/resources when requested; and
- (h) The NPO resorting to complex banking arrangements or financial networks that are not necessary for its transactions, especially for transfers abroad.

Part III: Red Flag Indicators on the Misuse of Legal Persons

Labuan IBFC is exposed to the risks of complex structure of Labuan legal persons being abused for illicit purposes. This is due to fact that their structural flexibility and capacity to separate ownership from control may create such vulnerabilities. Based on risk assessment conducted on Labuan legal persons, the potential common threats associated with these entities are fraud, corruption and tax evasion. The legal persons are expose to misuse, including concealment of the beneficial owner (BO), concealment of the origin or movement of funds, or facilitation of complex arrangements designed to disguise ML/TF activities. Detecting red flag indicators associated with the misuse of Labuan legal persons is therefore essential to effectively mitigating ML/TF risks.

1. Indicators Relating to Business Structure or Nature

- (a) Incorporation of entities with business activities that are ***inconsistent with the background or expertise*** of the directors or shareholders;
- (b) Use of ***complex ownership structures*** by companies associated with PEPs without clear commercial or economic rationale;
- (c) Multiple legal persons share the ***same directors, shareholders, addresses, or contact details***;
- (d) ***Rapid movement of funds*** through accounts without any identifiable economic purpose;
- (e) ***Unusually high paid-up capital*** that is not sufficiently commensurate with the entity's financial capacity or business justification;
- (f) ***Frequent or unexplained changes*** in business activities or sectors;
- (g) Newly incorporated entities reporting ***unusually high revenue or capital size*** inconsistent with industry norms or startup profile; and
- (h) ***Rapid expansion into unrelated business sectors*** without explanation.

2. Indicators Relating Legal Persons Structure or Profile of Shareholder and Director

- (a) Incorporation of legal entities involving ***foreign*** directors or shareholders with ***multiple passports or dual citizenships***;
- (b) ***Frequent or unexplained changes*** in directors and shareholders without clear justification;

- (c) Use of ***nominee directors or shareholders*** where the BO's identity is not clearly disclosed;
- (d) Directors or shareholders with ***little or no relevant experience, qualifications, or background*** relevant to the company's stated business;
- (e) ***High turnover*** of board members and senior management within a short period;
- (f) Directors and shareholders ***linked to adverse media reports, sanction lists or PEPs***; and
- (g) Directors and shareholders ***reluctance to provide information*** on ownership, PEP status, or relationship with government-linked companies (GLCs).

3. Indicators Relating to Exposure to GLC

- (a) ***Unusual payments from or to GLCs*** that do not align with the entity's stated business profile;
- (b) ***Contracts or tenders*** awarded by GLCs that ***appear disproportionate to the company's size, capacity or track record***;
- (c) ***Mismatch*** between the company's profile and the volume or type of government-related or GLC-related transactions;
- (d) ***Individuals who hold influence in a GLC but are simultaneously involved in private entities*** that conduct business with the same GLC, creating a potential ***conflict of interest***;
- (e) Individuals ***receiving unexplained preferential treatment from GLCs or government agencies*** (e.g., fast-tracked approvals or exclusive rights); and
- (f) Dormant companies that ***frequently receive substantial GLC payments*** (e.g., grants, contracts, subsidies or procurement).

4. Indicators Relating to Exposure to PEP

- (a) ***Involvement of a PEP or close associate in ownership, management or decision-making roles without clear business justification***;
- (b) ***Unexplained wealth, lifestyle, or financial capacity*** inconsistent with declared or known PEP income;
- (c) ***Use of family members or associates*** to conceal the PEP's involvement in the legal entity;

- (d) **Frequent changes in ownership or management** around election cycles or political events;
- (e) **Payments to consultants, intermediaries or agents** known to be *linked to PEPs without substantiated service delivery*; and
- (f) **Overreliance on political connections** to justify business arrangements.

5. Indicators Relating to the Use of Nominee Arrangements

- (a) Use of nominee shareholders or directors to **conceal the identity of the true BO**;
- (b) Nominee arrangements involving individuals with **no apparent relationship to the business**;
- (c) **Repeated use of the same nominee** across unrelated entities;
- (d) Nominee **unable to demonstrate understanding** of the entity's operations or purpose; and
- (e) Nominee **paid unusually high fees** inconsistent with the scope of work.

6. Indicators Relating to the Complexity of BO Structures

- (a) **Failure to disclose** BO information accurately or timely;
- (b) **Inconsistent, incomplete or contradictory** BO declarations;
- (c) Use of **complex ownership structures** to conceal BO identity (e.g. layers of offshore companies);
- (d) BO **linked to adverse media, sanctions, or PEPs** but not disclosed;
- (e) **Reluctance to provide information** on BO or supporting documents;
- (f) **Inconsistent or missing BO disclosures** especially when there is known or suspected PEP involvement;
- (g) **Failure to update BO information** or to notify Labuan Trust Companies of changes in BO details; and
- (h) **Concealment of PEP ownership** through layers of companies, nominees or offshore structures.